The Makkah Defence Pact’s First Real Test

Pakistan must prove that collective security can strengthen regional deterrence without compromising diplomatic independence or drawing the country into another protracted conflict.

The first serious test of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement may not be fought on a battlefield. It may be decided in the space between a military commitment and a diplomatic negotiation.

That distinction matters enormously for Pakistan. Barely three months after Islamabad, Riyadh and Ankara signed their trilateral defence agreement, the Middle East is again confronting the possibility of a wider conflict. Houthi attacks have sharpened Saudi Arabia’s security concerns, tensions surrounding Iran remain dangerously unresolved, and the three signatories are being asked to turn their promise of collective defence into practical arrangements.

Yet on October 26, senior representatives of the same three countries travelled to Tehran for talks aimed at reducing regional tensions. Their participation offered an important reminder: military preparedness and diplomacy need not be competing instruments of statecraft.

For Islamabad, however, the challenge is more complicated. Pakistan has undertaken commitments to defend Saudi Arabia while maintaining relations with Iran, seeking regional de-escalation and confronting significant economic pressures at home. How it reconciles these responsibilities will determine whether the Makkah agreement becomes a stabilising security arrangement or another source of strategic vulnerability.

From declaration to obligation

Signed in Makkah on August 7 by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the 16-article agreement is considerably more consequential than an ordinary defence cooperation memorandum.

Its central provision, Article 2, declares that an external armed attack against one of the three countries will be treated as an attack against all. It envisages immediate assistance and cooperation in exercising the right of collective self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

The agreement also extends beyond military assistance. It provides for joint training, intelligence sharing, defence production, technological collaboration, logistical support and a permanent mechanism for political and military consultation.

The strategic logic is understandable. Saudi Arabia seeks stronger protection against threats to its territory and critical infrastructure. Turkey brings a substantial military establishment and an expanding defence industry. Pakistan contributes established military capabilities and longstanding strategic relationships with both partners.

Collectively, these advantages could improve deterrence, reduce dependence on external security guarantees and strengthen the ability of regional countries to respond to shared threats.

But the agreement also creates obligations whose consequences will depend on how its provisions are interpreted.

The published treaty text does not require every signatory to respond to every crisis with an identical military commitment. Article 2 provides for an assessment of the assistance required and allows the parties to determine the nature and extent of their support according to available capabilities.

This qualification is essential. Collective defence is not necessarily synonymous with collective participation in war.

An effective alliance must be sufficiently credible to discourage aggression while remaining flexible enough to prevent a localised confrontation from becoming a wider conflict. Whether the Makkah pact can achieve both objectives remains uncertain.

The Houthi dilemma

The immediate pressure comes from Yemen.

Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia have revived questions about the kingdom’s vulnerability and the responsibilities of its new defence partners. The threat to civilian populations, economic infrastructure and important religious sites cannot be dismissed.

On October 5, the agreement’s Strategic Political and Defence Committee met in Riyadh and endorsed steps to put collective defence commitments into practice. According to the joint statement issued by Pakistan’s Foreign Office, the three countries agreed to facilitate the rapid deployment of previously agreed military forces and capabilities, subject to their national legislation.

The decision demonstrated political resolve. It did not, however, publicly establish the precise composition of the forces involved, the rules governing their employment or the circumstances in which defensive assistance might expand into wider military operations.

There is also a question of treaty interpretation.

Article 2 initially refers to external armed attacks but subsequently describes aggression by another country or group of countries. The distinction becomes significant when the immediate threat comes from a non-state armed movement such as the Houthis.

Does every cross-border attack by an armed group activate the same collective-defence obligations as an attack by another state? What degree of attribution or collective assessment is required? Who determines whether a particular response remains defensive?

These questions cannot be resolved by political declarations alone.

For Pakistan, the critical distinction should be between defending Saudi territory against external attacks and becoming a participant in Yemen’s internal conflict.

Air-defence cooperation, early-warning capabilities, technical assistance and protection of critical installations may serve a legitimate defensive purpose. Direct participation in offensive operations inside Yemen would raise a different set of strategic, legal and political questions.

The agreement’s credibility will depend in part on whether its members can preserve that distinction.

The lessons of 2015

Pakistan has confronted a similar dilemma before.

In April 2015, following a contentious parliamentary debate over the Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen, Pakistan’s parliament adopted a resolution supporting neutrality in the Yemeni conflict while expressing unequivocal solidarity with Saudi Arabia against threats to its territorial integrity and the holy sites.

The resolution reflected an attempt to balance two legitimate but potentially competing considerations: maintaining Pakistan’s strategic partnership with Riyadh and avoiding direct involvement in another country’s war.

The circumstances of 2026 are different. Pakistan has subsequently signed a bilateral strategic mutual defence agreement with Saudi Arabia in September 2025 and now participates in a broader trilateral framework with Turkey.

Nevertheless, the underlying national interest has not disappeared.

Pakistan cannot afford to treat the defence of a partner’s sovereignty as an unrestricted mandate to participate in every regional confrontation involving that partner.

Nor should it ignore genuine threats to Saudi Arabia’s security. The relationship encompasses defence cooperation, economic assistance, investment, employment and an enduring political partnership.

The wiser course lies in clearly defining Pakistan’s responsibilities before a crisis makes such distinctions more difficult.

The 2015 parliamentary resolution offers an important precedent for public deliberation, even though it does not override subsequent international commitments.

Defence partnership, diplomatic independence

The October 26 meeting in Tehran may offer the clearest indication of how the Makkah agreement could contribute to stability rather than confrontation.

Senior representatives from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey met Iranian officials to discuss regional security and the possibility of further cooperation. The joint statement reported after the meeting indicated that the participants intended to continue their dialogue.

No comprehensive settlement emerged from those talks. Their significance was political rather than contractual.

The meeting demonstrated that Saudi Arabia could strengthen its defence arrangements without abandoning direct engagement with Tehran. It also allowed Pakistan to pursue mediation while remaining committed to the security of a close partner.

This dual approach is not inherently contradictory.

Deterrence can help create the conditions for negotiation. Diplomacy, in turn, can reduce the likelihood that deterrent commitments will need to be tested through military confrontation.

But maintaining both roles requires consistency.

Islamabad must ensure that its commitments to Saudi Arabia are not interpreted as hostility towards Iran. Equally, its diplomatic engagement with Tehran should not be allowed to create uncertainty about its opposition to attacks on Saudi territory and civilians.

For Pakistan, relations with Iran are not a peripheral consideration. The two countries share a border and face common challenges involving security, trade and regional instability. A prolonged deterioration in relations would complicate Pakistan’s western security environment at a time when its resources are already stretched.

The essential diplomatic task is therefore not to choose between Riyadh and Tehran. It is to help establish a regional understanding in which Saudi security and Iranian security are not treated as mutually exclusive objectives.

If the Makkah pact becomes a vehicle for such confidence-building, its contribution could extend well beyond conventional defence cooperation.

The missing parliamentary debate

Another important test concerns democratic accountability.

Turkey’s parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee approved the ratification bill on October 27, bringing the agreement closer to consideration by the full National Assembly. Opposition lawmakers questioned the possibility of military entanglement and the implications for Turkey’s existing international commitments.

Pakistan’s process has been markedly different.

The Foreign Office has confirmed that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia completed their domestic ratification procedures. Under Pakistan’s existing constitutional and administrative framework, the executive generally possesses authority to conclude international agreements without requiring parliamentary approval unless implementing legislation is necessary.

That legal position, however, should not end the political discussion.

A commitment capable of influencing future military deployments, regional relations and national security priorities deserves parliamentary examination, even where such examination is not a formal prerequisite for ratification.

Indeed, the Pakistani public gained access to the agreement’s detailed provisions primarily after the document entered Turkey’s parliamentary process.

This is hardly an ideal model of transparency.

The government should brief parliament on the treaty’s practical implications, the distinction between defensive and offensive commitments, the legal basis of military deployments and the arrangements for civilian oversight.

Operationally sensitive details can be examined through appropriate confidential procedures. Strategic accountability need not require the disclosure of military secrets.

Parliamentary engagement would also strengthen, rather than weaken, Pakistan’s negotiating position within the alliance. Commitments that command informed domestic support are more durable than those dependent exclusively on executive discretion.

The economic price of escalation

The debate cannot be separated from Pakistan’s economic vulnerabilities.

Instability in the Gulf affects far more than defence policy. Higher oil prices increase Pakistan’s import bill, place pressure on foreign exchange resources and complicate efforts to contain inflation.

Disruptions to shipping routes, insurance markets and aviation can impose additional costs on trade and businesses.

Saudi Arabia and the wider Gulf are also vital sources of overseas employment and workers’ remittances. According to State Bank of Pakistan figures reported in October, Pakistan received approximately $899 million in remittances from Saudi Arabia during September 2026 alone.

A prolonged regional conflict could consequently affect Pakistan through several channels simultaneously: energy imports, external payments, transport costs and the economic security of its overseas workforce.

These considerations reinforce the importance of preventing escalation rather than merely preparing to respond to it.

Military cooperation may improve regional deterrence. It cannot, by itself, insulate Pakistan’s economy from the consequences of war.

A test of strategic judgment

The Makkah pact is already acquiring institutional substance. Its joint committee has met, a secretariat has been envisaged in Saudi Arabia, and practical defence arrangements are under discussion.

Yet the agreement’s formal entry into force remains tied to completion of the ratification process by all parties. Article 16 provides for indefinite duration, with the possibility of withdrawal after the first ten years.

These are not trivial commitments. They require clear expectations, political trust and disciplined decision-making.

Pakistan should therefore pursue three priorities.

First, it must seek clarity on the circumstances that activate collective-defence consultations and the limits of military assistance, particularly when threats originate from non-state armed groups.

Second, it should insist that implementation remains consistent with domestic legal requirements, international law and a defensible distinction between protecting Saudi territory and participating in offensive operations elsewhere.

Third, Islamabad should invest as much political energy in mediation and regional confidence-building as it does in the military institutions of the new alliance.

There is no contradiction in supporting Saudi Arabia’s right to security while advocating a negotiated settlement in Yemen and preserving constructive engagement with Iran.

The real danger would arise if military solidarity displaced independent strategic judgment.

The Makkah agreement offers Pakistan an opportunity to help shape a more cooperative regional security order. But an alliance should be judged not simply by the military capabilities it assembles or the forcefulness of its declarations.

Its deeper measure is whether it reduces the likelihood of conflict, prevents unnecessary escalation and preserves the ability of its members to make responsible decisions under pressure.

For Pakistan, the pact’s first real test is therefore not how readily it can enter a war. It is how effectively it can help prevent one.

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