Pakistan’s surprising diplomatic resurgence with Trump’s Washington defies predictions. From $500M mineral deals to joint military exercises, explore the evolving US-Pakistan relationship in 2026.
When Donald Trump famously accused Pakistan of delivering nothing but “lies and deceit” during his first term, few imagined Islamabad would become one of Washington’s most celebrated partners within years. Yet by early 2026, Pakistan’s army chief was being warmly received at the White House, while India—long Washington’s “indispensable” Indo-Pacific partner—found itself on the receiving end of punitive 50% tariffs and diplomatic cold shoulders.
This dramatic reversal in fortunes marks one of the most striking geopolitical pivots in recent South Asian history. As Pakistan navigates its relationship with Washington in a post-Afghanistan withdrawal world, the bilateral dynamic has evolved from strained suspicion to pragmatic transactionalism, driven by converging interests in counterterrorism, critical minerals, and regional stability. Understanding this transformation requires examining not just what changed, but how Pakistan leveraged strategic opportunities while Washington recalibrated its approach to China, India, and South Asia more broadly.
From Estrangement to Engagement: The Thaw Begins
The Afghanistan withdrawal in August 2021 left US-Pakistan relations at a historic nadir. Throughout President Joe Biden’s tenure, Islamabad was effectively frozen out of high-level engagement. Biden never called Pakistan’s then-Prime Minister Imran Khan, and by 2021, a mid-level State Department official bluntly informed Pakistani counterparts that the bilateral relationship had been “downgraded.” The message was clear: with the Afghanistan chapter closed, Washington saw little strategic value in maintaining robust ties with Islamabad.
Pakistan’s subsequent political turbulence—including Khan’s ouster in 2022 and the installation of a coalition government led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif—did little to improve matters. The relationship remained mired in mutual recriminations over Pakistan’s alleged harboring of terrorist networks and Washington’s perceived neglect of Pakistani security concerns. When Trump returned to office in January 2025, Pakistani officials braced for worse. After all, Trump had previously threatened to cut all aid to Pakistan and openly favored India as a counterweight to China.
Yet within months, the impossible happened. By mid-2025, Pakistan had not only arrested the mastermind behind the Abbey Gate bombing—which killed 13 American service members during the chaotic Kabul evacuation—but had also positioned itself as a key mediator in Trump’s Middle East initiatives. When India and Pakistan erupted into a four-day military confrontation in May 2025, triggered by a terrorist attack in Kashmir that killed 26 civilians, Trump publicly claimed credit for brokering the ceasefire. While New Delhi firmly denied any third-party mediation, Pakistan amplified Trump’s narrative—even nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize.
That gesture of strategic flattery paid extraordinary dividends. By September 2025, Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, and Prime Minister Sharif were receiving lavish White House receptions. Trump praised Munir effusively, calling him his “favorite Field Marshal.” The optics were unmistakable: Pakistan had returned to Washington’s favor, while India’s relationship with the US entered what analysts describe as a “deep freeze.”
The Transactional Playbook: How Pakistan Won Washington
Pakistan’s diplomatic resurgence wasn’t accidental—it was the product of calculated strategy that aligned perfectly with Trump’s transactional foreign policy approach. Three pillars underpinned Islamabad’s successful charm offensive.
Strategic Lobbying and Crypto Diplomacy
Unlike India, which delayed hiring lobbyists until April 2025 and engaged only one firm, Pakistan moved swiftly. By January 2025, Islamabad had hired at least seven lobbying groups, specifically targeting firms with Trump family connections, including former Trump Organization executives and even a former Trump bodyguard. This first-mover advantage proved crucial in gaining access to Trump’s inner circle.
Equally shrewd was Pakistan’s embrace of cryptocurrency. In March 2025, Pakistan formed a Crypto Council and appointed a Minister for Crypto—moves aligned with Trump’s pro-crypto stance. By April, the Pakistan Crypto Council signed a deal with World Liberty Financial, a company in which the Trump family holds an estimated 60% stake. This convergence of interests created direct channels to the administration’s decision-makers. As Pakistan’s Crypto Minister Bilal bin Saqib declared at a Las Vegas event, he wanted to recognize Trump as “the president who saved crypto”—precisely the kind of personal validation Trump covets.
Concrete Counterterrorism Deliverables
Recognizing that Trump values tangible achievements over abstract strategic partnerships, Pakistan focused on delivering high-profile counterterrorism wins. The capture of the Abbey Gate bombing suspect gave Trump a concrete victory he could cite to Congress when defending closer ties with Pakistan. When General Erik Kurilla, then-chief of US Central Command, testified to Congress that Pakistan had been a “phenomenal partner in the counterterrorism world,” it marked a stunning reversal from years of American accusations.
This renewed security cooperation manifested in joint military exercises. In January 2026, Pakistan and the US conducted the 13th iteration of Inspired Gambit 2026, a two-week counterterrorism training exercise held at Pakistan’s National Counter Terrorism Centre. Involving professional contingents from both armies, the exercise focused on enhancing interoperability, refining tactics for urban warfare, and exchanging best practices. US officials described it as reflecting “the continued commitment of Pakistan and the United States towards collaborative efforts for peace and stability”—language unthinkable just years earlier.
These military-to-military contacts provided continuity even as broader political dynamics fluctuated. They signaled that despite historical tensions, both countries recognized shared interests in combating terrorism emanating from Afghanistan and stabilizing South Asia.
The Critical Minerals Gambit
Perhaps Pakistan’s most consequential strategic offering involved opening its largely untapped mineral wealth to American investment. During his September 2025 White House meeting with Trump, Field Marshal Munir opened a briefcase containing glistening mineral samples—a theatrical gesture symbolizing Pakistan’s willingness to provide Washington with alternatives to Chinese-dominated supply chains.
This wasn’t mere symbolism. In September, the Pakistani government signed a $500 million memorandum of understanding with US Strategic Metals (USSM) for cooperation on rare earth elements and critical minerals including antimony, copper, tungsten, and rare earths like neodymium and praseodymium. By October 2025, Pakistan dispatched its first consignment to the United States—a historic milestone inaugurating what both sides framed as a new chapter in bilateral relations.
For Washington, this partnership addresses acute supply-chain vulnerabilities. China controls roughly 70% of global rare earth production and nearly 90% of refining capacity—resources essential for defense systems, semiconductors, electric vehicles, and renewable energy. Antimony, in particular, has been identified as a material of defense concern; it’s integral to ammunition primers, flame retardants, and advanced electronics. Trump himself touted plans to help Pakistan tap its “massive oil reserves,” though the actual scale of Pakistan’s petroleum deposits remains disputed.
For Pakistan, the minerals deal offers desperately needed foreign investment. The country received just $808 million in foreign direct investment during the first half of fiscal year 2026—down from $1.425 billion the previous year, according to State Bank figures. With its mining sector contributing only 3.2% to GDP and a mere 0.1% to global exports, unlocking mineral wealth represents potential economic transformation. Pakistan’s Reko Diq copper-gold deposit in Balochistan is considered one of the world’s largest underdeveloped sites, with estimated reserves of 15 million tonnes of copper and 26 million ounces of gold—potentially generating $2.8 billion in annual exports once operational.
Strategic Breathing Space: The 2026 National Defence Strategy
Pakistan’s diplomatic gains coincided with a broader US strategic recalibration reflected in the 2026 National Defence Strategy released by the Pentagon in January 2026. Unlike the Biden administration’s 2022 strategy, which explicitly termed China “the most consequential strategic competitor,” the 2026 document avoids framing Beijing as an existential enemy. Instead, it states that the US does not seek to “dominate, humiliate or strangle China” but rather to ensure that neither China nor anyone else can dominate America or its allies.
This softer tone toward China offers what Pakistani officials describe as “strategic breathing space.” As one official told The Express Tribune, “If the United States is no longer seeking confrontation with China, it reduces pressure on countries like Pakistan that have strong relations with Beijing. This approach gives us greater diplomatic space.”
Notably, India—frequently highlighted in previous US policy documents—is entirely absent from the 24-page 2026 strategy. This omission reflects the Trump administration’s frustration with New Delhi’s independent stance, particularly India’s refusal to acknowledge US mediation in the May 2025 conflict. While China remains a priority (mentioned 24 times compared to 13 in 2022), the shift from confrontation to “strategic stability” creates openings for Pakistan to maintain robust ties with both Beijing and Washington without choosing sides.
Former Pakistani diplomat Abdul Basit characterized the shift as Washington “biding time to devise ways to counter China and retain its supremacy,” adding that “for now, we wouldn’t be seeing the two countries ratcheting up bilateral tensions to an irredeemable point. This is good for Pakistan so long as it lasts.”
India’s Stumble, Pakistan’s Opportunity
India’s cooling relationship with Washington stems partly from diplomatic miscalculations but also from fundamental differences in approach. While Pakistan offered tangible, transactional benefits—counterterrorism deliverables, crypto partnerships, mineral access—India emphasized abstract values like shared democracy and long-term strategic convergence. In Trump’s transactional worldview, where bilateral relationships are assessed through narrow cost-benefit lenses, Pakistan’s concrete offerings outweighed India’s strategic rhetoric.
India’s refusal to publicly validate Trump’s mediation claims proved particularly costly. When New Delhi openly rejected Trump’s assertion that he’d brokered the May ceasefire, it wounded Trump’s ego—always a dangerous move. The subsequent diplomatic fallout saw India hit with brutal 50% tariffs, no Quad summit, and collapsed high-level dialogue. Early warmth from Trump’s first term gave way to public disagreements, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi reportedly declining invitations and rebutting mediation claims directly.
Pakistan seized this moment. According to The Diplomat, “where India saw an insult to its sovereignty, Pakistan saw a massive opportunity.” By amplifying Trump’s mediation narrative and nominating him for the Nobel Prize, Pakistan provided the public validation Trump craved—validation India withheld. This strategic flexibility, combined with Pakistan’s willingness to be seen as cooperative rather than independent, proved decisive.
Yet Pakistan’s gains also reflect structural factors. Former National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan reportedly alleged that Trump “threw the India relationship over the side” because India assumed its role in the Quad and Indo-Pacific strategy would insulate it from economic pressure—a fundamental miscalculation. Trump’s worldview separates trade relationships from security partnerships, viewing the former through strictly transactional lenses. India’s failure to grasp this distinction left it vulnerable.
Economic Dimensions: Trade, Tariffs, and Investment
Beyond security cooperation and minerals, the US-Pakistan relationship now encompasses meaningful economic engagement. In July 2025, the two countries finalized a trade agreement that reduced tariffs on Pakistani exports from 29% to 19%—the lowest among South Asian nations and far below the 50% tariffs imposed on India. This tariff relief, coupled with expanded market access, aims to boost bilateral trade and attract US investment in Pakistan’s infrastructure.
The agreement also encompasses petroleum exploration, though the extent of Pakistan’s oil reserves remains contentious. While Trump touted Pakistan’s “massive” reserves, the reality is more modest. Pakistan currently imports roughly 80% of its petroleum needs. Most proven reserves lie in insurgency-hit Balochistan, complicating extraction efforts. When Trump announced the oil development deal, many Pakistanis were puzzled—decades of exploration efforts have yielded limited commercial success.
Still, the symbolism matters. By framing Pakistan as a resource-rich investment destination, Washington signals its willingness to view the relationship through economic rather than purely security lenses. Pakistan, for its part, is leveraging this momentum to attract broader foreign direct investment. In February 2026, Pakistan participated in a US-hosted critical minerals ministerial in Washington, alongside G7 members, India, South Korea, Australia, and several African nations. Pakistan’s delegation aims to highlight its untapped mineral potential and secure investment commitments.
Looking ahead, Pakistan has invited both the US and China to the Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum scheduled for April 8-9, 2026, in Islamabad. The forum targets $6-8 billion in annual mineral export potential, focusing on copper, gold, and rare earths. This dual engagement reflects Pakistan’s pragmatic approach: deepening China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) cooperation with Beijing while simultaneously courting Western investors—a balancing act facilitated by Washington’s less confrontational posture toward China.
The Balochistan Challenge: Security Risks and Investment Realities
Yet Pakistan’s minerals bonanza faces formidable obstacles, particularly in Balochistan—Pakistan’s poorest province despite hosting immense natural resource wealth. Baloch separatist groups, notably the Baloch Liberation Army, have repeatedly targeted mining and infrastructure projects, viewing them as exploitative. Since 2018, more than 50 attacks have been recorded. On February 1, 2026, Baloch separatists launched coordinated attacks across the province, killing dozens and damaging banks and infrastructure—a stark reminder of the security challenges facing investors.
Government data shows that security costs at the Reko Diq site alone reached approximately Rs 3.74 billion (about $13-14 million) by mid-2025, covering deployment of around 700 Frontier Corps personnel. These expenses underscore the high-risk operating environment. While mines themselves can be defended, road links, power transmission lines, and water pipelines remain exposed, increasing risk premiums and insurance costs across the sector.
As Berlin-based researcher Saher Baloch told Al Jazeera, there’s a “core contradiction” in Pakistan’s approach: “Balochistan’s instability isn’t episodic. It is structural and rooted in longstanding grievances over ownership, political exclusion and militarisation.” Attracting international investment while neglecting political grievances creates unsustainable foundations.
Moreover, the involvement of Pakistan’s military-run Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) in mineral deals raises governance concerns. That the $500 million USSM agreement was signed through the FWO rather than civilian ministries reflects the army’s direct stake in resource management—a pattern consistent with Pakistan’s hybrid civil-military governance structure. For foreign investors, this arrangement can expedite approvals but also concentrates risk in opaque military-controlled institutions.
Chinese firms, already deeply invested in Balochistan through CPEC, have borne the brunt of separatist violence. Official figures suggest nearly 20,000 Chinese nationals live in Pakistan; at least 20 have been killed since 2021 in attacks tied to these projects. The arrival of US investment in the same regions could complicate an already fraught security picture. However, analysts like Uzair Younus of The Asia Group argue that Pakistani resources aren’t exclusive to any single partner: “No country has been given carte blanche on Pakistani resources besides Pakistan itself.”
The China Factor: Balancing Beijing and Washington
Pakistan’s warming ties with Washington inevitably raise questions about its relationship with China—its “all-weather” strategic partner and largest investor. Through CPEC, China has committed over $60 billion to infrastructure projects in Pakistan since 2013, transforming the bilateral relationship into deep economic interdependence. Chinese investments dominate sectors from energy to ports, with Gwadar Port in Balochistan serving as a critical node connecting southwestern China to the Arabian Sea.
For now, Pakistan appears intent on maintaining robust ties with both Washington and Beijing—a balancing act facilitated by the 2026 US National Defence Strategy’s less confrontational approach to China. Pakistani officials privately describe their strategy as “hedging without choosing”—maximizing benefits from both relationships while avoiding entanglement in great power rivalry.
This approach carries risks. Washington’s interest in Pakistan stems partly from desire to diversify supply chains away from Chinese dominance. Beijing, accustomed to privileged access to Pakistani resources and strategic real estate, may view American inroads with suspicion. Yet some analysts believe complementarity is possible. Younus suggests that “unlocking commercial opportunities” through US investment “would allow sustaining payments to Chinese investors and creditors that have lent money to Pakistan for infrastructure projects.”
Similarly, Islamabad-based security analyst Amir Rana argues that while China might have hoped for monopoly on Pakistani minerals, the relationship won’t be “harmed in any major way.” Commercial prudence, he contends, favors working with multiple partners. For China, stability in Pakistan—ensured by economic prosperity and reduced terrorism—serves Beijing’s CPEC interests regardless of who invests.
Pakistan’s simultaneous invitation of both the US and China to its April 2026 minerals forum epitomizes this balancing act. By positioning itself as a resource hub open to multiple partners, Islamabad seeks to avoid zero-sum dynamics while maximizing investment inflows. Whether this strategy proves sustainable depends on how US-China competition evolves and whether Pakistan can maintain credible neutrality.
Regional Implications: India’s Response and South Asian Security
Pakistan’s diplomatic resurgence carries significant implications for South Asian security dynamics. India, observing Pakistan’s improved access to Washington, has responded by diversifying its partnerships. New Delhi has strengthened ties with Europe, Russia (despite Western pressure), and even cautiously engaged China on certain economic issues. Trade negotiations with the EU and others aim to offset US pressures while maintaining strategic autonomy.
The May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict—a four-day exchange of missiles and drones—demonstrated the enduring volatility of bilateral relations. While both sides claimed victory and Trump asserted mediating the ceasefire, the episode underscored how quickly tensions can escalate between nuclear-armed neighbors. Sources indicated that in future crises, Trump’s administration might prioritize de-escalation favoring Pakistan’s narrative to claim diplomatic victories—a shift that could alter deterrence calculations for both rivals.
For India, this represents a strategic setback. Having invested heavily in building the US-India strategic partnership—including defense agreements like COMCASA and BECA, designation as a net security provider, and incorporation into groupings like the Quad and I2U2—New Delhi now confronts a Washington willing to sideline those achievements over transactional disputes. Indian opposition parties have criticized the Modi government for the perceived downgrade, once hailed as a cornerstone of India’s rise.
Yet the situation remains fluid. India retains significant advantages: a $3.7 trillion economy (compared to Pakistan’s $350 billion), robust defense industry partnerships with the US and other powers, and deep integration into global supply chains. The Quad—comprising the US, India, Japan, and Australia—continues to function despite recent strains. If Trump’s second term proves as unpredictable as his first, today’s estrangement could reverse as quickly as it developed.
For Pakistan, the challenge lies in converting short-term diplomatic wins into sustained engagement. History suggests US-Pakistan relations follow cyclical patterns: periods of close cooperation (1950s-1960s, 1980s Afghan war, post-9/11) alternating with estrangement (1990s sanctions, post-2011 Bin Laden raid, Biden years). Each cycle has been driven by specific American interests—containing the Soviet Union, fighting terrorism, managing Afghanistan—raising questions about whether the current rapprochement will endure once those interests shift.
Challenges Ahead: Sustainability and Structural Constraints
Despite recent gains, Pakistan faces formidable challenges in sustaining improved US relations. Four structural constraints merit particular attention.
Economic Fragility and IMF Dependency
Pakistan’s economy remains precarious. External debt exceeds $130 billion, inflation hovers around 20%, and foreign exchange reserves barely cover three months of imports. The country is currently negotiating its 24th IMF program—a cycle of bailouts that reflects chronic structural weaknesses. While mineral exports offer long-term potential, developing extraction capacity, processing facilities, and transport infrastructure will require years and billions in investment before generating significant revenues.
Declining foreign direct investment—down 43% year-on-year—signals investor skepticism about security and governance. Without macroeconomic stability, Pakistan’s ability to capitalize on improved US ties remains limited. As Imtiaz Gul of the Centre for Research and Security Studies noted, “No sane national or international investor will risk their money in an extremely volatile situation.”
Governance and Civil-Military Dynamics
Pakistan’s hybrid governance structure—where the military exercises significant influence over foreign policy, security matters, and economic decisions—complicates engagement with democratic partners. The prominence of Field Marshal Munir in US engagements, sometimes overshadowing civilian leaders, reinforces perceptions of military dominance. As observers noted, Trump’s reception of Munir recalled Cold War patterns when Washington prioritized convenience over democratic principles.
This dynamic creates vulnerabilities. Future US administrations may prioritize strengthening civilian institutions and democratic governance—values less prominent in Trump’s transactional approach but central to American foreign policy traditions. Pakistan’s ability to navigate such shifts will test its diplomatic agility.
Afghanistan and Regional Terrorism
The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan continues to generate security spillover into Pakistan. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has intensified attacks on Pakistani security forces, conducting bombings, kidnappings, and ambushes. Pakistan accuses Afghanistan’s Taliban government of providing sanctuary to TTP, straining relations with Kabul despite ideological affinities.
For Washington, Pakistan’s utility as a counterterrorism partner depends partly on managing these cross-border threats. If terrorist attacks emanating from Afghanistan or Pakistan-held territory target Western interests—or if groups like al-Qaeda reconstitute—US patience with Islamabad could evaporate. The historical pattern of “do more” demands from Washington remains fresh in Pakistani memory, potentially limiting how far either side is willing to deepen security cooperation.
Domestic Political Instability
Pakistan’s domestic politics remain volatile. Former Prime Minister Imran Khan, currently imprisoned on various charges, retains significant popular support and regularly mobilizes protests against the current government. Political uncertainty undermines policy consistency, as successive governments may pursue different approaches to US relations depending on their ideological orientations and constituency pressures.
Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party has historically adopted more populist, anti-Western rhetoric compared to the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz currently in power. If political winds shift again, Pakistan’s eagerness to align with Washington could diminish, particularly if the US is perceived as supporting specific factions over others—a charge frequently leveled in Pakistani political discourse.
The Gaza Dimension: Navigating Middle East Politics
Pakistan’s participation in Trump’s “Board of Peace” for Gaza adds another layer of complexity to the bilateral relationship. In January 2026, Pakistan formally accepted an invitation to join the board, aimed at resolving global conflicts and achieving lasting peace in Gaza. For Pakistan—a nation where 91% of citizens express solidarity with Palestinians—this engagement represents a delicate balancing act.
Critics within Pakistan view the Board of Peace as potentially paving the way for normalization with Israel, despite Pakistan’s longstanding policy of not recognizing the Israeli state. In January 2026, Pakistani activist Gul Rukh Abdullah was briefly arrested during a Gaza solidarity protest, sparking concerns that Islamabad is softening its pro-Palestinian stance to appease Washington. As veteran commentator Cyril Almeida observed, joining the board alongside other Muslim nations is part of a pragmatic decision to “stick close to Trump, but do so in a pack—minimizing blowback and reducing the risk of attracting Trump’s ire.”
Pakistan joined without parliamentary consultation, fueling suspicions that the government prioritizes its budding US relationship over domestic sentiment. The Board of Peace—which also includes countries like Turkey, Indonesia, and potentially Israel—places Pakistan in the awkward position of cooperating on an issue where public opinion strongly opposes compromise. Managing this tension will require deft political messaging domestically while delivering on commitments to Washington.
For Trump, having Pakistan on the board serves multiple purposes: demonstrating Muslim-majority countries’ support for his Gaza initiative, providing diplomatic cover for controversial policies, and rewarding Islamabad’s cooperation. For Pakistan, participation offers continued access to Trump’s inner circle but at the risk of alienating its own public—particularly if the board’s activities are perceived as legitimizing Israeli actions.
The Transactional Durability Question: Will It Last?
The central question surrounding the current US-Pakistan rapprochement is sustainability. Trump’s transactional approach has delivered short-term gains for Islamabad, but history suggests such alignments can unravel rapidly once immediate interests diverge. As ORF researchers note, Washington’s engagement with Islamabad may be “as cyclical, erratic, and transactional as earlier ones.”
Several factors could derail the relationship:
Trump’s Term Limits: Trump’s presidency ends in January 2029. A successor administration—whether Republican or Democratic—may prioritize different partnerships or return to emphasizing democratic governance, human rights, and strategic convergence over transactional deals. Pakistan would need to cultivate bipartisan support to sustain gains beyond Trump’s tenure.
India’s Rehabilitation: If US-India relations improve—through tariff reductions, renewed strategic dialogue, or resolution of specific disputes—Pakistan’s relative standing could diminish. India’s economic and strategic weight far exceeds Pakistan’s, suggesting that once immediate irritants are resolved, Washington may revert to prioritizing New Delhi.
Afghanistan Developments: Deteriorating security in Afghanistan or major terrorist attacks linked to Pakistan-based groups could rapidly shift American perceptions. The historical precedent of the Bin Laden raid in Abbottabad—which devastated US-Pakistan relations overnight—looms as a cautionary tale.
China Competition: If US-China relations deteriorate sharply, Washington may pressure Pakistan to distance itself from Beijing. Pakistan’s refusal—given its deep economic dependence on China—could strain ties with the US. Conversely, if US-China relations stabilize further, Pakistan’s value as a hedge against Chinese influence could diminish.
Domestic Backlash: Within Pakistan, sections of civil society, opposition politicians, and religious groups may mobilize against perceived over-dependence on the US, particularly on issues like Israel-Palestine. If the government faces significant domestic pressure, it may need to recalibrate its engagement with Washington.
Yet there are reasons for cautious optimism about durability. The minerals partnership creates tangible economic interdependencies. Unlike ephemeral security arrangements, commercial contracts involve long-term commitments, corporate stakeholders, and institutional relationships that transcend individual political leaders. If American companies invest meaningfully in Pakistani mining and infrastructure, they’ll develop vested interests in stability and continued engagement.
Similarly, counterterrorism cooperation builds institutional relationships between militaries, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement—relationships that can survive political turbulence at the leadership level. The 13th iteration of Inspired Gambit exercises demonstrates decades-long continuity despite fluctuating bilateral relations.
Forward-Looking Scenarios: Three Pathways
Looking ahead to 2027-2030, three broad scenarios capture the range of possible trajectories for US-Pakistan relations:
Scenario 1: Deepening Partnership
In this optimistic scenario, the current rapprochement evolves into sustained engagement characterized by:
- Mineral sector investments scaling up significantly, with multiple US firms entering Pakistan alongside USSM, creating an ecosystem of American commercial interests
- Security cooperation expanding beyond counterterrorism to include joint naval exercises, intelligence sharing on China’s Belt and Road vulnerabilities, and Pakistan facilitating US interests in Central Asia
- Economic integration through preferential trade agreements, technology transfers, and Pakistan’s integration into US-led supply chain initiatives as an alternative to China
- Diplomatic coordination on Middle East issues, with Pakistan serving as an effective interlocutor for US interests in the Muslim world
This scenario requires Pakistan successfully addressing security challenges in Balochistan, demonstrating governance improvements, managing domestic opposition to US alignment, and Washington maintaining interest beyond Trump’s tenure. Probability: 25-30%
Scenario 2: Transactional Stability
A moderate scenario where relations remain workable but limited:
- Modest economic engagement continues, with minerals exports growing gradually but not transforming Pakistan’s economy
- Security cooperation persists at current levels through regular exercises and intelligence sharing, without major expansion
- Political ties remain cordial but shallow, characterized by episodic high-level engagements rather than deep institutional integration
- China factor prevents closer US-Pakistan alignment, with Islamabad maintaining careful balance between Beijing and Washington
This scenario reflects managed expectations on both sides—Pakistan appreciates improved access without overreliance, while Washington engages Pakistan instrumentally for specific objectives without illusions of strategic partnership. Probability: 50-55%
Scenario 3: Renewed Estrangement
A pessimistic scenario where the relationship deteriorates:
- Terrorist attack linked to Pakistan triggers US backlash, reminiscent of post-Abbottabad dynamics
- India rehabilitation leads Washington to deprioritize Pakistan, with New Delhi successfully repairing ties through economic concessions or strategic accommodations
- Domestic political change in Pakistan brings anti-US government to power, rolling back current policies
- US-China confrontation forces Pakistan to choose sides, with Islamabad opting for Beijing over Washington
- Governance failures or economic collapse undermine Pakistan’s attractiveness as a partner, leading to renewed US disengagement
This scenario echoes historical patterns of US-Pakistan estrangement following periods of tactical cooperation. Probability: 15-20%
The most likely outcome is the middle scenario—transactional stability characterized by limited but sustained engagement. Both countries have learned from past cycles of boom and bust, suggesting modest expectations and risk management rather than aspirations for deep strategic partnership.
Conclusion: Pragmatism Over Partnership
The Washington-Islamabad tightrope in the post-withdrawal era reflects a fundamentally transactional relationship between two countries with divergent long-term interests but converging short-term needs. Pakistan’s remarkable diplomatic resurgence under Trump demonstrates the effectiveness of strategic flattery, concrete deliverables, and alignment with specific American priorities—particularly when the alternative (India) stumbles through diplomatic miscalculation.
Yet this rapprochement should be understood as pragmatic engagement rather than strategic partnership. Neither country harbors illusions about the other. Washington views Pakistan instrumentally—as a counterterrorism partner, minerals supplier, and potential hedge against China. Islamabad, having endured decades of unreliable American engagement, maintains deep ties with China while opportunistically capitalizing on improved US access.
The relationship’s trajectory will depend on whether both sides can institutionalize their engagement beyond personal chemistry between Trump and Pakistani leaders. Mineral investments, military exercises, and trade agreements create scaffolding for sustained interaction, but structural challenges—Balochistan insecurity, economic fragility, domestic political volatility—could derail progress rapidly.
For regional observers, the current dynamics underscore the fluidity of great power alignments in South Asia. India’s temporary estrangement from Washington demonstrates that even robust strategic partnerships can fray when transactional interests conflict. Pakistan’s gains, while significant, may prove equally reversible once American priorities shift.
As Pakistan participates in critical minerals forums, hosts military exercises, and engages on Middle East peace initiatives, it walks a careful tightrope—balancing relationships with China and the US, managing domestic opinion, and addressing security challenges. Success requires sustained diplomatic dexterity, economic reform, and realistic expectations about what Washington can and will provide.
The post-withdrawal era has offered Pakistan an unexpected opportunity to redefine its relationship with the United States. Whether Islamabad can convert this moment into lasting engagement—or whether history’s cyclical patterns reassert themselves—will shape South Asian geopolitics for years to come. For now, both countries are making the most of converging interests, even as they recognize the relationship’s inherent fragility.
The Washington-Islamabad tightrope remains exactly that: a precarious balancing act requiring constant attention, calibration, and realism. Neither side can afford to look down too long.
