U.S. Primacy Endures as China and Russia Challenge the Order

The post-Cold War assumption that American primacy would endure indefinitely has given way to a more unsettled reality. In 2025, the United States still accounted for roughly one-third of global military expenditure, maintained an unmatched network of alliances and overseas bases, and retained leadership in critical technologies. Yet China has closed the economic and industrial gap at a pace few anticipated, while Russia has demonstrated that a nuclear-armed state with limited resources can still disrupt European security and complicate Western strategy. The foreign policies of these three powers are not simply reacting to a multipolar world; they are actively shaping whether the system remains unipolar in structure even as it becomes more contested in practice.

In April, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported that world military expenditure reached $2.9 trillion in 2025, the eleventh consecutive annual rise and the highest level in the institute’s records. The headline number is less revealing than its composition. The United States, China and Russia together accounted for $1.48 trillion, or 51 percent of the global total. American spending fell by 7.5 percent, to $954 billion, mainly because Washington approved no new military aid for Ukraine that year. China’s budget rose 7.4 percent, to $336 billion, its thirty-first consecutive annual increase. Russia spent an estimated $190 billion, a burden equal to 7.5 percent of its GDP.

Those numbers capture a paradox at the center of today’s international politics. The United States is still the dominant military power by a wide margin, yet its share of spending is shrinking, its willingness to shoulder global responsibilities is in question, and its principal rival is spending more each year. Two questions follow. Has the unipolar moment that began in 1991 ended? And if not, what has replaced it?

This essay argues that the unipolar moment has not ended, but it is being contested in ways that matter. The United States retains decisive advantages in power projection, alliances, technology and structural influence. China is the only power able to challenge that position over time. Russia is a formidable but constrained revisionist state. Their divergent foreign policies are pushing the international system toward something that resembles a bipolar core with multipolar features, a shape that carries real consequences for the agency of smaller states, including those of the Global South.

Measuring Power in the Current Order

Power is easiest to measure where it is most visible. On military spending, the gap between the United States and its rivals remains large. Washington’s $954 billion dwarfs China’s $336 billion and Russia’s $190 billion. The gap is wider still once allies are counted, since NATO members together spent $1.58 trillion, or 55 percent of world military spending. American spending also buys something rivals cannot easily replicate: global logistics, carrier groups, basing networks and decades of interoperability with allied forces.

Nuclear power is more balanced than the spending figures suggest. SIPRI estimates the global inventory at 12,187 warheads as of January 2026, of which about 9,745 were held in military stockpiles for potential use. Russia and the United States together possess roughly 83 percent of the operational warheads. China is the fastest-growing nuclear power, with an estimated 620 warheads, and SIPRI judges that it could have at least as many intercontinental missiles as either Washington or Moscow by the turn of the decade. Even so, China’s arsenal would remain a fraction of the American and Russian stockpiles for the foreseeable future.

The economic picture is more complicated. The International Monetary Fund’s April 2026 projections place the United States at roughly $32 trillion in nominal GDP and China at roughly $21 trillion. Russia is a distant third at around $2.7 trillion, and the IMF has projected Russian growth of only 0.8 percent for 2026. On purchasing-power measures, China’s economy is larger than America’s by most IMF-based estimates, a reflection of its manufacturing scale and lower domestic prices. Nominal measures matter more for global finance and technology markets, and there the United States still leads.

Technology and structural power favor Washington more decisively. American firms dominate frontier artificial intelligence, advanced semiconductor design, and much of the cloud and software infrastructure on which other economies run. China is competitive in many dual-use industries, from batteries and solar components to telecommunications and drones, and it is building parallel payment and financial channels. Russia lags well behind in advanced manufacturing. Beyond technology, the dollar still underwrites most international trade and reserve holdings, and the United States can use that position to impose sanctions with unusual reach.

Why, then, does only the United States qualify as a full global pole? The answer lies less in any single metric than in the combination. C. Raja Mohan argues in Foreign Affairs that the test is whether a state can project power worldwide, shape international norms and institutions, and absorb systemic shocks. By that standard, China is a comprehensive regional power with a global economic footprint but not yet the global reach or institutional authority that the United States exercises. Russia is a major military power with a narrow economic base. The United States alone meets the full set of criteria, even as its margin over China narrows.

U.S. Foreign Policy: Transactional Unilateralism

The American approach under the second Trump administration represents a sharp break in style, if not always in substance. The older model of liberal internationalism, which rested on multilateral institutions, long-term alliance commitments and the promotion of open markets, has given way to a more explicitly transactional posture. Tariffs are used as tools of bargaining, alliance commitments are treated as conditional, and foreign aid and military assistance are weighed against domestic priorities.

The strengths of this approach are real. Washington has shown a capacity to extract concessions quickly, whether through trade negotiations, pressure on allies to raise defence budgets, or the use of export controls and financial sanctions. The American market, the dollar and the technology sector give the United States unusual leverage, and a government willing to use that leverage without apology can change behaviour that multilateral diplomacy has struggled to move. European governments, for example, have responded to American pressure with the fastest rise in military spending among NATO members since 1953, in part because Washington signaled that burden-sharing was no longer optional.

The costs are less visible but accumulate over time. Soft power depends on credibility, and credibility depends on predictability. When a government’s commitments can change with a presidential post or a tariff announcement, allies begin hedging, and rivals begin testing. The decision to halt new military assistance to Ukraine is a case in point. It reduced American spending, but it also sent a message to partners about the durability of American support. SIPRI and other analysts expect the decline in U.S. military spending to be short-lived, but the episode illustrates the tension at the heart of the approach.

There is also a risk that transactionalism becomes a substitute for strategy. Mohan’s critique in Foreign Affairs is that the United States increasingly exercises what he calls unilateral power while shedding the responsibilities that once made that power legitimate. Because the country still possesses the strongest military and financial tools, it can afford to act alone in the short run. But leadership that relies on coercion rather than consent tends to need more coercion over time, and allies that feel used tend to look for alternatives.

The United States’ geography offers a significant margin for error. Oceans separate it from the Eurasian landmass where most great-power rivalries play out, and its resource base is large. That margin allows Washington to make choices that would be more dangerous for other states. The question for the coming decade is whether American power can be exercised with enough restraint and institutional steadiness to remain persuasive, not merely effective.

China’s Foreign Policy: Near-Peer Competition and Order-Shaping

Under Xi Jinping, China has pursued two strategies at once. The first is military modernisation focused on the Western Pacific, with an emphasis on Taiwan and on the capacity to contest the first island chain. The second is an engagement with the Global South through development finance, infrastructure investment, trade, and a growing network of institutions such as the expanded BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Beijing describes this as a move toward an “equal and orderly multipolar world,” and it presents its approach as a more inclusive alternative to Western-dominated governance.

The military dimension is hard to dismiss. China’s defence budget has risen for three decades, and its navy now has the largest number of hulls of any country. Its nuclear arsenal is expanding faster than that of any other state. Taiwan has responded to the pressure with its own spending increase of roughly 14 percent in 2025, a sign of how regional security dynamics are feeding into one another. The military balance in the Taiwan Strait is therefore not simply a matter of Chinese capability; it is also a matter of how neighbors and allies choose to respond.

The Global South strategy is more ambiguous. Many developing countries value Chinese infrastructure, trade access and the absence of political conditionality. They have also learned, through debt-restructuring episodes and disputed project financing, that these benefits come with costs and dependencies. China’s relationship with the Global South is best understood as a bargain rather than a bloc. Partners welcome Chinese capital and diplomatic support, but they resist being drawn into Beijing’s strategic competition with Washington.

The limits of this approach are structural. China’s population is aging, its growth is slowing, and its export model remains dependent on access to foreign markets and advanced technologies that Washington is working to restrict. Beijing can build influence through trade and finance, but it has not yet demonstrated the security commitments, institutional credibility or cultural reach that would allow it to replace the United States in the regions where it competes. Its rhetoric of multipolarity serves both a genuine preference for reduced Western centrality and a more ambitious project of rewriting rules in its favor. Those two aims are not identical, and smaller states notice the difference.

The most consequential question is whether China can convert economic weight into sustainable influence without triggering the kind of balancing coalitions that have repeatedly formed against rising powers. So far, the answer has been mixed. Japan, Australia, India, the Philippines and several European states are deepening security ties with one another and with Washington, even as they continue to trade heavily with China.

Russia’s Foreign Policy: Revisionist Disruption Within Limits

Russia’s ambitions are considerable, but its capacity is narrower. Moscow seeks a sphere of influence in Ukraine and across its near abroad, wants to erode American alliance networks in Europe and Asia, and promotes a vision of “civilizational states” that reject universal Western norms on governance and human rights. Its tools include nuclear deterrence, energy exports, conventional military force and an increasingly close partnership with China.

The war in Ukraine, now in its fourth year, has been both a demonstration of Russian resolve and a revelation of its limits. Russia has absorbed heavy sanctions, reorganised its economy around military production, and sustained a long war of attrition. Its military burden, at 7.5 percent of GDP, is among the highest in the world. But the costs are substantial. Moscow has spent heavily on munitions and manpower, growth has slowed sharply, and its economy has become more dependent on Chinese markets and inputs. The IMF’s forecast for 2026 growth below one percent reflects these pressures, even as higher energy prices have offered some relief.

Russia’s nuclear arsenal remains its most important source of influence. With the largest stockpile in the world, it can deter direct attack on its territory and shape the calculations of its adversaries. But nuclear weight does not translate easily into political weight. A state with a narrow economic base, a shrinking population and limited technological capacity cannot sustain global influence on its own. That is why Russia’s partnership with China matters so much to Moscow, and why it is also a source of vulnerability.

Thomas Graham of the Council on Foreign Relations makes a useful point here. Being a great power is central to Russia’s national identity, yet the Kremlin is wary of becoming excessively dependent on China. Russia wants to be a pole in its own right, not a junior partner in someone else’s order. That tension will shape Moscow’s choices for years to come.

The China-Russia Alignment and Systemic Effects

The relationship between Beijing and Moscow is among the most discussed features of the current order, and among the most misread. In the weeks before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the two governments declared a “no limits” partnership. A Council on Foreign Relations study from late 2024 by Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine examined what that partnership meant for American policy, concluding that it provided China with substantial practical benefits, from discounted energy to a diversion of American attention and resources.

Those benefits are real. Chinese dual-use goods and industrial inputs have supported the Russian war effort. Russian energy has helped meet Chinese demand. Both governments have sought to reduce their reliance on Western financial systems and to expand trade in national currencies. A U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission fact sheet from August 2026 notes that China has become indispensable to Russia’s economy and military production since 2022, a dependence that gives Beijing considerable leverage.

Yet the partnership is not an alliance, and its limits are becoming clearer. A CFR analysis by Stuart Reid acknowledges that the partnership has its limits and that friction between the two capitals is real, but argues that such frictions are common to many alliances and are manageable. Brookings scholars, in a July 2026 discussion of the relationship, similarly emphasize the asymmetries and mistrust that shape it. Beijing has no interest in becoming bound to Moscow’s war, and Moscow has no interest in being subordinated to Beijing’s commercial and strategic preferences. The Institute for Security and Development Policy in Stockholm reaches a comparable conclusion in its assessment of the partnership’s peak: a limited partnership is the most accurate description of the relationship today.

For the United States and its allies, the systemic implications are significant. The China-Russia relationship complicates American efforts to isolate either power, and it creates the possibility of coordinated pressure in Europe, the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. But it is a poor substitute for a unified bloc, and its lack of formal commitments limits how far either partner will go to support the other in a crisis. Washington’s most effective response has been to pursue targeted export controls and burden-sharing demands on allies while avoiding a posture that drives the partners closer together. Whether that balance holds will depend on decisions taken in Taipei, Kyiv and Washington as much as in Beijing and Moscow.

Changing Dynamics and Outlook

The international system is best described as contested rather than settled. Economic weight is diffusing. Middle powers, including India, Gulf states and ASEAN members, are practising multi-alignment, seeking partnerships across competing blocs. New forums such as the expanded BRICS have expanded the number of venues where non-Western states can coordinate. Energy, technology and supply chains have become arenas of direct competition.

Yet the counter-evidence of unipolarity is substantial. No single state or coalition matches the American combination of military reach, technological leadership, financial centrality and alliance networks. The BRICS grouping has struggled to produce coordinated policy, and its members pursue divergent interests. The United States can still impose costs unilaterally, and it retains the ability to shape the rules that others must follow. The debate between those who see a multipolar world arriving and those who see American primacy persisting has become one of the defining arguments in foreign-policy circles. Mohan contends that talk of multipolarity is premature. Emma Ashford, in her recent writing and in her Foreign Affairs essay “Making Multipolarity Work,” argues that a world of unbalanced multipolarity has already arrived and that Washington should adjust its strategy accordingly. Both views contain insight. The more defensible position may lie between them: an unbalanced, transitional system in which the United States remains the strongest actor but no longer the only one that determines outcomes.

For the Global South, this structure is consequential. Middle powers and developing states gain bargaining room when great powers compete, because they can extract concessions from more than one patron. India, for example, seeks a multipolar Asia while maintaining distinct ties with Washington, Beijing and Moscow. Many African and Southeast Asian governments pursue similar strategies. But the same environment carries risks. Competition for influence can lead to debt dependencies, security entanglements and a crowding out of local priorities. Smaller states benefit most when they have multiple options and institutions that can protect their autonomy. The erosion of multilateral institutions, and the weaponization of trade and finance, threatens precisely those safeguards.

Four arenas will shape the next five to ten years. The first is Taiwan. A cross-strait crisis would be the most dangerous test of the system, and the military balance in the region is moving in ways that make miscalculation more likely. The second is Ukraine and European security. Whatever the terms of any settlement, Europe is now spending more on defense and will be the central theater of long-term deterrence against Russia. The third is technology, particularly artificial intelligence and semiconductors, where export controls and industrial policy are creating separate technological ecosystems. The fourth is finance, where the dollar’s dominance remains intact but is increasingly contested by alternative payment systems and reserve diversification.

Plausible trajectories range widely. In one, the United States modernizes its industrial base, sustains its alliances, and manages competition with China without direct conflict, producing a durable bipolar core with multipolar margins. In a second, Chinese economic and military growth continues while American political polarization constrains its strategy, and the balance tilts gradually toward Beijing in Asia. In a third, a crisis over Taiwan or a wider war in Europe triggers abrupt alignments that the current institutions cannot manage. None of these outcomes is inevitable, and each depends on choices that have not yet been made.

What should the great powers prioritize? For the United States, the priority should be rebuilding the credibility that transactionalism erodes: maintaining alliance commitments that partners can rely on, investing in industrial capacity, and recognizing that coercive leverage is most effective when it is part of a broader strategy. For China, the priority should be converting economic weight into institutions and commitments that reassure neighbors rather than frighten them, and avoiding actions around Taiwan that would unite its neighbors against it. For Russia, the priority is harder to define, since its current course offers little prospect of a settlement that preserves its influence without costly concessions. Its leaders would be wise to recognize that the war has accelerated Europe’s rearmament and deepened the dependence on China that Moscow says it wants to avoid. For other states, the priority should be preserving the institutions and norms that protect smaller powers, including arms-control frameworks, trade rules and dispute-resolution mechanisms, even where the great powers have weakened them.

The honest conclusion is that great-power competition is poorly predictable. The data show trends: rising Chinese capabilities, a declining American share of global spending, a Russian economy under strain, and a growing number of states seeking strategic autonomy. But the data do not reveal how leaders will respond to crises, how alliances will hold under pressure, or whether a single miscalculation will reshape the system. Analysts who claim certainty about the next decade are overstating what they know. The more responsible course is to plan for several futures, to keep channels of communication open between rivals, and to recognize that the most dangerous moments in international politics have often come from confident assumptions that proved wrong.

The unipolar moment has not ended. It is being contested, and the contest is changing what power means and who can exercise it. The task for policymakers in Washington, Beijing, Moscow and the capitals of the middle powers is to manage that change without mistaking its direction for its outcome.

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